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EVALUATION OF AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE OPERATIONS USING
PROCESS MEASURES
Kunal Kapoor, Pallavi Dharwada, Nikhil Iyengar, Joel S. Greenstein, Anand K. Gramopadhye
Human Computer Systems Laboratory, Clemson University, South Carolina
This research focuses on the development of a proactive system (a Web-based Surveillance and Auditing Tool -
WebSAT), which promotes standardization in data collection and identifies the contributing factors that impact
aircraft safety. This system will document the processes and the outcomes of maintenance activities, make the
results more accessible, and reduce future maintenance error rates. WebSAT will capture and analyze data for the
different operations involved in surveillance, auditing, and airworthiness directives. To achieve standardization in
data collection, data needs to be collected on certain variables which measure maintenance processes. These
variables are defined as process measures. The process measures incorporate the response and observation-based
data collected during surveillance, audits, and the control of the airworthiness directives. This paper elaborates on
the processes that exist in the aviation maintenance work group, the concerns that need to be addressed while
identifying the process measures, and the utility of these process measures in conducting data analysis. Once data is
captured in terms of these process measures, data analysis can be conducted to identify the potential problematic
areas affecting the safety of an aircraft.
Introduction
The  mission  of  the  FAA  is  to  provide  safe  and
reliable air transportation and to ensure aircraft
airworthiness. Maintenance error has been found to
be a crucial factor in aircraft accidents (Boeing/ATA,
1995). The increasing number of maintenance and
inspection errors in the aviation industry has
motivated the need for human factors research.
Human factors research in maintenance has deemed
the human as the central part of the aviation system
(Gramopadhye et al., 2000). The emphasis on the
human and his role in aviation systems results in the
development of error tolerant systems. Such systems
will be efficient if they closely monitor and evaluate
aircraft maintenance and inspection activities. Air
transportation is becoming increasingly complex. The
significance of the maintenance function was
captured by Weick et al. (1999) when they observed
that: “Maintenance people come into contact with the
largest number of failures, at earlier stages of
development, and have an ongoing sense of the
vulnerabilities in the technology, sloppiness in the
operations, gaps in the procedures, and sequences by
which one error triggers another”. Given the ever
increasing complexity of aircraft, a significant
proportion of these errors come at the hands of the
maintenance personnel themselves, due to greater
demands on these individuals. Thus, it is very
important to take a closer look at the humans
involved in aviation maintenance, understand the
causal  factors  for  their  errors  and  the  possible
solutions to counter this situation.
The aviation maintenance industry has also invested a
significant effort in developing methodologies for
investigating maintenance errors. The literature on
human error has its foundations in early studies of
errors made by pilots (Fitts, 1947), work following
the Three Mile Island incident, recent work in human
reliability and the development of error taxonomies
(Swain and Guttman, 1983, Norman, 1981, Rouse
and Rouse, 1983, Rasmussen, 1982, Reason, 1990).
This research has centered on analyzing maintenance
accidents. Figures emerging from the United
Kingdom Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) show a
steady rise in the number of maintenance error
mandatory occurrence reports over the period 1990 to
2000 (Courteney, 2001). A recent Boeing study of
worldwide commercial jet aircraft accidents over that
same period shows a significant increase in the rate
of accidents where maintenance and inspection were
primary factors (ICAO, 2003). The FAA, in its
strategic plan for human factors in aviation
maintenance, through to 2003, cited statistics from
the Air Transport Association of America (ATA)
showing that the number of passenger miles flown by
the largest US airlines increased 187% from 1983
through to 1995. Over that same period, the number
of aircraft operated by those airlines increased 70%,
but the number of aviation maintenance technicians
increased only 27%. The FAA concluded that the
only way the maintenance program could cope with
the increased workload was by increased efficiency at
the worker level (McKenna, 2002).
Attempts have been made to define a core set of
constructs for a safety climate (Flin et al., 2000).
Although not entirely successful in establishing core
dimensions, this research is useful in suggesting
constructs that should be considered for inclusion in
research on maintenance errors. Taylor and Thomas
368
(2003) used a self-report questionnaire called the
Maintenance Resource Management/Technical
Operations Questionnaire (MRM/TOQ) to measure
what they regarded as two fundamental parameters in
aviation maintenance: professionalism and trust. The
dimension of professionalism is defined in their
questionnaire in terms of reactions to work stressors
and personal assertiveness. Trust is defined in terms
of relations with co-workers and supervisors.
Patankar (2003) constructed a questionnaire called
the Organizational Safety Culture Questionnaire
which included questions from the MRM/TOQ along
with items from questionnaires developed outside the
maintenance environment. Following the application
of exploratory factor analytic routines to a dataset
generated from respondents that included 124
maintenance engineers, Patankar identified four
factors as having particular relevance to the safety
goals of aviation organizations. They are emphasis on
compliance with standard operating procedures,
collective commitment to safety, individual sense of
responsibility toward safety, and a high level of
employee-management trust.
In addition to descriptive accident causation models,
classification schemes, and culture surveys, there is a
need for empirically validated models/tools that
capture data on maintenance work and provide a
means of assessing this data. However, such models
and schemes often tend to be ad hoc, varying across
the industry, with little standardization. In order to
contend with this issue, new empirical models and
tools are needed which employ standardized data
collection procedures, provide a basis for predicting
unsafe conditions, and design interventions that will
lead to reductions in maintenance errors.
Process Measures
This research seeks to identify error causes and
occurrences using a web based surveillance and
auditing tool (WebSAT). The purpose of WebSAT is
to capture and analyze data for different processes
involved in the surveillance, auditing, and
airworthiness directives functions of the aviation
maintenance industry. To achieve standardization in
data collection, data needs to be collected on certain
variables which measure maintenance processes.
These variables are defined as process measures.
The process measures incorporate the response and
observation-based data collected during surveillance,
audits, and the airworthiness directives control
processes. Once data is captured in terms of these
process measures, data analysis can be conducted to
identify the potential problematic areas affecting the
safety of an aircraft. In this stage of data analysis, the
performance of processes and those conducting these
processes will also be evaluated.
Quality Assurance Work Functions
The complexity of the inspection and maintenance
system is complicated by a variety of geographically
dispersed entities ranging from large international
carriers, repair and maintenance facilities through
regional and commuter airlines, to the fixed-based
operators associated with general aviation (Kapoor et
al., 2004, Dharwada et al., 2004). Inspection is
regulated by the FAA, as is maintenance. However,
while adherence to inspection procedures and
protocols is closely monitored, evaluating the
efficacy of these procedures is much more difficult.
This section explains the quality assurance work
functions which are responsible for aircraft
maintenance.
Surveillance
Surveillance is the day-to-day oversight and
evaluation of the work contracted to an airframe
substantial maintenance vendor to determine the level
of compliance with airline’s Maintenance Program
and Maintenance Manual with respect to the airline’s
and FAA requirements. For example, FedEx, our
partner in this project has a surveillance
representative, stationed at the vendor location who
schedules surveillance of an incoming aircraft. The
specific  task  to  be  performed  on  an  aircraft  at  a
vendor location is available on a work card. The
representative performs surveillance on different
work cards according to a surveillance schedule. The
results are documented and used to analyze the risk
factors associated with the concerned vendor and
aircraft. The FedEx surveillance department classifies
the data obtained from a surveillance visit at the
maintenance facility into categories. These categories
are based on various surveillance tasks and the
C.A.S.E. (Coordinating Agency for Supplier
Evaluation) guidelines that are adhered to by the
substantial maintenance vendor and the airline. The
team  used  these  categories  as  a  starting  point  to
identify process measures. Some of the categories
currently being used by FedEx are in-process
surveillance, final walk around, and verification
surveillance.
Technical Audit
The system level evaluation of standards and
procedures of suppliers, fuel vendors, and ramp
operations  done  on  a  periodic  basis  is  referred  to  as
Technical Audit. The work function of technical
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audits is to ensure compliance with Federal Aviation
Regulations (FARs), and established company
policies and procedures. The team worked towards
identifying process measures for this work function.
Data collected from the technical audit checklists will
be utilized for analysis on the effectiveness of the
technical audit process.
Internal Audit
The evaluation of internal processes in the
departments of an airline is referred to as Internal
Audit. The work function of the internal audit
department is to sample the processes being used by
departments in an organization and to verify their
compliance with regulatory, company and
departmental policies and procedures. Similar to the
technical audits, the data collected from internal audit
checklists will be grouped into process measures to
facilitate further data analysis and assess the
effectiveness of the internal audit process.
Airworthiness Directives Department
The evaluation of the applicability, loading, and
tracking of airworthiness directives is referred to as
airworthiness directives control. The work function
of the Airworthiness Directives (AD) control
department is to review AD-related Engineering
Order/Work Instruction Cards (EO/WIC), the
acquisition process, and the customer’s maintenance
manual. The data collected from these processes will
be grouped into categories to facilitate further data
analysis and assess the effectiveness of the
airworthiness directives control department.
Observations during the Identification of the Process
Measures
The team adopted the following data collection
methods: Interviews, Observation Sessions,
Document Study, and Questionnaires (Iyengar et al.,
2004). The team determined that the process
measures being identified must include all the data
that is gathered during the maintenance operations.
The team observed inconsistency in the definition of
the existing categories among the surveillance
representatives. The representative’s own experience
could be a road block, preventing him from correctly
assigning an error to a category. The internal audit
department employed a definitive structure of six
categories, and after scrutiny of the internal audit
documents, the team concluded that these categories
covered the entire span of the data generated during
audits in the internal audit department. The data
analysis in the technical audit department lacked
strategy. The personnel in the airworthiness
directives department utilized canned statements for
data analysis, which lacked strategy. There were two
major  work  domains  being  considered  in  the  AD
department: information verification based on AD
department-related engineering order/ work
instruction cards (EO/WIC), manuals and other
documents involved with the compliance of
airworthiness directives. The AD department also
verifies information related to AD status reports.
Observations for Surveillance
The surveillance representatives relied on their
memory  to  categorize  what  they  saw  in  the
maintenance facility. This suggested that there must
be a manageable number of categories and they
should be easy to remember. There were process
measures being used for data analysis in surveillance,
some of which were redundant, and there was no
consensus among the surveillance personnel within
the department at FedEx in the classification of a
work card into a specific process measure. There
were two distinct categories of process measures:
Technical and Non-Technical. Process measures
which include surveillance involving scheduled
maintenance activities performed on an aircraft
during a maintenance event are referred to as
technical process measures. These process measures
include technical activities that are hands-on and
performed directly on the aircraft. Technical activity
also includes maintenance that is performed in a back
shop setting on a removed aircraft part. An example
would be a panel removed and routed to a composite
back shop for repair, then reinstalled on the aircraft.
The surveillance activities involving verification of
standardized procedures, referenced manuals,
equipment, and facility maintenance requirements are
referred to as non-technical process measures. It was
important for the team to understand the purpose of
the data being gathered and its relevance to aircraft
safety. Hence, collection of data on non-technical
measures was given equal emphasis on technical
measures. The team recognized the importance of
incorporating the concerns of the quality assurance
representatives while finalizing the list of process
measures for surveillance.
Observations for Internal Audits
The internal audit department at FedEx was working
with a robust set of process measures. These were
administration, training, records, safety, manuals, and
procedures. The team scrutinized the documents and
check lists the personnel in the internal audit
department work with. These process measures
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would effectively categorize all the data being
generated in this department.
Observations for Technical Audits
The technical audits department conducts annual
audits on all FedEx vendors. These vendors are
substantial supplier vendors, fuel, ramp operations,
and aircraft maintenance vendors using checklists
which are query based. The team determined that
each check list had a series of questions dedicated to
one fundamental domain, such as inspection or
facility control. These domains were consistent for
the different checklists emphasizing the needs of
diverse vendors such as the supplier vendor and the
fuel vendor. A final consensus within the research
team finalized the process measures as these
categories within check lists itself.
Observations for Airworthiness Directives
Department
The personnel in this department are involved in two
primary activities. They validate the information
presented on AD-related EO/WIC, manuals, status
reports and other documents involved with the
compliance of airworthiness directives. The
personnel also verify the adequacy of the activities
involved in the loading and tracking of airworthiness
directives, including inspection intervals.
Process Measures Validation
Once the research team finalized the process
measures definition document, and finalized a list of
the process measures to be used for the different
work  functions,  it  was  important  for  the  research
team to validate their research efforts. The team
conducted a two-phase on-line survey to validate
results. The online survey was initially sent to the
surveillance, auditing, and airworthiness directives
department personnel at FedEx. There were six
participants from each department. Prior to the
participants taking the survey, the research team sent
out an e-mail to them. This e-mail had detailed
instructions  about  how  to  take  the  survey,  and  the
team also expressed the goal of the survey. A process
measure definitions document to be read before
taking the survey was sent to the participants. The
survey had four modules. The survey was designed to
last a maximum of 60 minutes. It included 7 to 21
questions depending on the survey module. The
questions were of two kinds. There were forced-
choice questions, and open-ended questions. Each
question had a field for the comments of the
personnel taking the survey. The reason for this was
that the team wanted detailed feedback from the
participants. The participants taking the survey were
not identified. The team gave two weeks to get inputs
from the participants of the survey. Once the data
was generated and analyzed, the research team
iterated its definition document to incorporate
changes expressed by the participants.
In the next phase, the research team sent out the same
survey to other supporting and partnering airline
organizations: Alaska Airlines, Delta Airlines, IATA,
and America West. The results of this survey are still
awaited.
Use of Process Measures in WebSAT
The following is a list of identified process measures
for the fours modules WebSAT is involved with.
Process Measures for Surveillance
1. In process Surveillance
2. Verification Surveillance
3. Final Walk Around
4. Documentation Surveillance
5. Facility Surveillance
6. Procedures Manual Surveillance
The other data capturing modules in surveillance
which facilitate capturing of the data but are not
process measures of the surveillance work function
are given below:
1. Additional Findings Module
2. Fuel Surveillance Module
The above mentioned modules are not process
measures since they do not evaluate the routine
surveillance process. The information captured from
the additional findings module is important for an
airline for documentation purpose. This data is not
used to rate vendor performance of maintenance
tasks. Fuel surveillance is not performed in every
maintenance facility. To avoid inconsistencies in data
classification across the facilities, the team proposed
to treat the process of fuel surveillance as a separate
module. The data captured in this module will be
analyzed separately to comment on the effectiveness
of fuel surveillance.
















Process Measures for Airworthiness Directives
1. Information Verification
2. Loading and Tracking Verification
The WebSAT framework strategy for the research
revolved around three tiers (stages). The first tier
involved the collection of data with respect to work
functions of surveillance, auditing (internal &
technical), and airworthiness directives. Once the
data involving the maintenance of an aircraft was
gathered from these sources, they would be
scrutinized with respect to the process measures. In
the next stage, tier 2, the analysis of the relevant data
would be categorized. In tier 3, a final analysis would
categorize the variables into risk (impact variables),
and non-risk variables. To implement this
framework, WebSAT will use a data model to
interpret and analyze the data gathered. Traditional
analytical techniques deal mainly with the
identification of accident sequence and seek unsafe
acts or conditions leading to the accident. Such
techniques include the sequence of events (domino
effect), known precedents etc. For example, Pate-
Cornell (1993) has developed an analytical
framework, to establish the causal relationship
between the basic events, decision and actions, and
organization factors. She demonstrated the use of this
framework in the analysis of the Piper Alpha accident
which  occurred  due  to  a  massive  explosion  on  the
offshore oil and gas production platform (Pate-
Cornell, 1993, Cojazzi and Cacciabue, 1994).
However, the post-hoc nature of these frameworks
renders them inadequate for a proactive WebSAT.
The team hopes to develop a data model in which the
process measures can be used to establish causal
relationships in the QA processes.
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